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* * * 
Honoring Carson Bride, Tyler Clementi,  
and for every teenager who will become upstanders. 
 
* * * 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. This lawsuit is brought on behalf of Carson Bride, a 16-year-old teenager who 
took his own life after being a victim of cyberbullying on the following mobile phone 
applications (“apps”): “Snapchat” owned by Defendant Snap, Inc. (“Snap Inc.”), “YOLO” 
owned by Defendant Yolo Technologies, Inc., and “LMK” owned by Defendant 
LightSpace, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), all of which are popular apps among 
teenagers. 
2. Carson asserts claims for strict liability, negligence, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of consumer protection laws 
on behalf of class members against the entities that developed and marketed Snapchat, 
YOLO, and LMK, for creating, maintaining, and distributing anonymous messaging apps 
to teens that are inherently dangerous and defective, and for falsely promising the 
enforcement of safeguards. Carson’s mother, Kristin Bride, also bring claims of 
misrepresentation against Defendant YOLO. 
3. Tyler Clementi Foundation, a national advocacy organization whose mission 
is to combat bullying and cyberbullying, joins in this lawsuit. 
4. The claims in this action are not about third-party users’ communications; 


































hence, this action does not focus on the users’ communications themselves nor does it seek 
to punish the senders of the bullying and harassing messages.  
5. Rather, the claims here are about how the anonymous messaging apps  
designed and distributed products and services that are inherently dangerous, unsafe, 
useless. For decades, anonymous messaging apps been known to cause severe and fatal 
harm to teenagers, hence, the harms caused by Defendants’ apps were foreseeable.  
6. The misrepresentation claims alleged focus on the concrete statements made 
by the apps about the specific actions they would take to safeguard young users from harm:  
 YOLO stated that it would reveal the identities and ban users who engage in 
bullying and harassing behavior. YOLO stated that it has a zero-tolerance 
policy for bullying.  
 LMK stated that it would implement and enforce zero-tolerance policies 
against bullying and harassing behavior, monitor and report any bullying and 
harassing behavior to law enforcement, and prohibit sexually explicit and 
inappropriate texts and photos.  
 Snapchat stated that it would remove third party apps that allow bullying and 
harassing behavior on its platform.  
7. Despite the affirmative statements above, facts alleged here demonstrate that 
Defendants’ apps are unable or unwilling to take action and carry out their promises to 
safeguard children.  


































8. Due to the Defendants’ apps’ defective design and their misrepresentations, 
millions of users are harmed daily, suffering permanent consequences.  
9. Defendants knew, or should have known, that irreversible, deadly 
consequences will arise from the use of anonymous messaging apps used by teens.  
10. In 2010, 17-year-old Alexis Pilkington from Long Island, New York was 
cyberbullied on Formspring.me, an anonymous question and answer site, and ended her 
own life.1  
11. In 2011, 15-year-old Natasha MacBryde from Worcestershire, U.K., took her 
own life after receiving anonymous messages on Formspring.me. According to news 
reports, her family “believe[d] that the anonymous postings on the Formspring social 
networking website were a significant contributor” to her death.2  
12. In 2011, 14-year-old Jamey Rodemeyer from Buffalo, New York took his life 
after receiving slurs on Formspring.me from anonymous senders.3  
13. In 2012, 13-year-old Ciara Pugsley, from Leitrim, Ireland took her own life 
after being cyberbullied on an anonymous website, ask.fm.4  
14. In 2015, 18-year-old Elizabeth Long created a Change.org petition signed by 
 
1 Town angry over Net slurs at suicide victim, NBC NEWS, March 26, 2010, at https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36058532  
2 Natasha MacBryde: Rail death teen threatened online, BBC.COM, July 21, 2011, at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
hereford-worcester-14239702  
3 Jamey Rodemeyer Suicide: Police Consider Criminal Bullying Charges, ABC NEWS, September 21, 2011, at 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/jamey-rodemeyer-suicide-ny-police-open-criminal-
investigation/story?id=14580832#.UXfKtrU3uSo  
4 Third suicide in weeks linked to Cyberbullying, IRISH EXAMINER, Oct. 29, 2012, at 
https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-20212271.html  


































83,363 individuals to the creators of Yik Yak, an anonymous messaging app. Her message 
in the petition is loud and clear, and an excerpt is quoted here (emphasis added):  
My name is Elizabeth. I’m 18 years old, and earlier this year I tried to commit 
suicide. While still recovering, I started seeing messages about me on Yik Yak, 
anonymously telling me that I should kill myself. And I am not the only one. . . it is 
time that we stand up and do something about it before a life is senselessly lost 
because of this app. Yik Yak allows users to post anonymous messages that are 
broadcast to other users close by. . . With the shield of anonymity, users have zero 
accountability for their posts, and can openly spread rumors, call classmates 
hurtful names, send threats, or even tell someone to kill themselves -- and all of 
these things are happening. The app claims that it is not meant to be used by 
people under 17, but there are no safeguards to prevent younger users from 
downloading the app . . . The app claims to not tolerate bullying or threats, but no 
action is being taken to remove threatening or harmful posts, or suspend users who 
write them . . .  we want the app removed from the Apple App Store and Google 
Play immediately.5 
 
15. Unfortunately, change did not happen in time, and later that year in 2015, 
Jacob Marberger, another teenager who was anonymously cyberbullied on the same app 
Yik Yak, ended his own life.6 
16. In 2018, a parent witnessed her 13-year-old daughter receive an anonymous 
message on the app Sarahah from a user who wrote: “I hope she kills herself.” The parent 
started a Change.org petition that was signed by 466,714 supporters. Sarahah was removed 
from Apple and Google app stores after reported instances of severe cyberbullying became 
 
5 Shut Down the app “Yik Yak”, CHANGE.ORG, at https://www.change.org/p/tyler-droll-and-brooks-buffington-shut-down-
the-app-yik-yak  
6 Student’s Suicide Prompts Investigation of College’s Culture, Yik Yak, NBC PHILADELPHIA.COM, Dec. 3, 2015, 
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/task-force-washington-college-jacob-marberger-bullying-social-media-yik-
yak/157654/ 


































known to the public.7 
17. According to a media interview by Tech Crunch, YOLO’s founder Gregoire 
Henrion stated that the app focused on blocking 10% of offensive messaging. Henrion 
reportedly admitted that YOLO saw reviews about bullying from its users. Yet, in that 
report, Henrion brushed off the concern about bullying saying “it’s nothing compared to 
any other anonymous app.”8  
18. Carson’s parents notified YOLO app and its founder Gregoire Henrion about 
Carson’s death caused by cyberbullying and conveyed the urgency of revealing the 
identities of the users so that they can be prevented from harming other victims.  To date, 
no one has responded.  
19. Despite the widely reported danger of anonymous apps, opportunistic app 
developers like Defendants continued to reap profits using the same, defective, and 
inherently unsafe designs in apps that are marketed and used predominantly by teens. 
20. The dangerous design of YOLO and LMK, like all the other anonymous apps 
described above, provide the means, motive, and opportunity for cyberbullying. 
21. This lawsuit demands that Defendants be held accountable for the wrongful 
deaths, personal injuries, and other losses that Carson Bride and his family have suffered 
as a result of Defendants’ defective and dangerously designed apps. 
 
7 Ban apps like Sarahah where my daughter was told to “kill herself”, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/app-store-
google-play-ban-apps-like-sarahah-where-my-daughter-was-told-to-kill-herself?redirect=false 
8 Teen hit Yolo raises $8M to let you Snapchat anonymously, TECH CRUNCH, Feb. 28, 2020, 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/28/anonymous-snapchat-group-chat-yolo/ 


































22. This putative class action further demands that Defendants be held 
accountable for designing defective and dangerous products and services, and for making 
false promises about the actions they would take to safeguard teens from cyberbullying. 
Such actions and misrepresentations violate consumer protection laws and other tort laws 
stated herein.  
23. This putative class action additionally demands that YOLO and LMK be 
immediately discontinued and banned from the market until they can prove that effective 
safeguards are implemented and enforced. Additionally, for Snap Inc., this action demands 
that it immediately remove all third-party apps that fail to set up appropriate safeguards for 
young users from cyberbullying. 
24. Defendants’ owners, investors, and affiliates should be restrained from 
marketing, selling, operating, and otherwise replicating its services, specifically, 
anonymous messaging features, in the form of a different corporate entity and service. 
PARTIES 
 
25. Plaintiffs, estate of Carson Bride through his appointed administrator Kristin 
Bride, Kristin Bride on behalf of herself, and Tyler Clementi Foundation (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”), bring this action, on behalf of themselves and similarly-situated putative class 
members comprised of approximately 93 million U.S.-based users of “Snapchat” owned 
by Defendant Snap, Inc. (“Snap Inc.”), approximately 10 million users of app “YOLO” 
owned by Defendant Yolo Technologies, Inc. (“YOLO”), and approximately 1 million 






































26. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Carson Bride was a resident and a citizen of 
Oregon. Plaintiff Carson Bride on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated minor 
users of Defendants’ apps that comprise the putative National class and Oregon sub-class, 
brings this class action against each and all of the Defendants.   
27. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Kristin Bride was a resident and a citizen of 
Oregon. Kristin Bride brings claims as the appointed administrator of Carson’s estate and 
on behalf of herself. 
28. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation is a bona fide 501(c)(3) organization 
registered in New York9 whose mission is to end online and offline bullying, harassment 
and humiliation. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation advocates for and educates parents 
and children who struggle with cyberbullying and safety issues. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi 
Foundation brings this class action against each and all of the Defendants on behalf of itself 
and the putative National class and New York sub-class.  
29. Tyler Clementi Foundation was founded in 2010 by the Clementi family in 
memory of Tyler Clementi, a beloved son and family member who took his own life after 
 
9  Tyler Clementi Foundation’s temporary address during the time of the pandemic is at a P.O. Box in New Jersey, but its 
registration and work is centered in New York.  


































suffering from cyberbullying.  
30. Tyler Clementi Foundation works with individuals, minors, schools, 
educators, parents, companies, faith communities, universities and other individuals who 
themselves are or have been bullied as consumers of online platforms, or have children or 
students who are at risk of being bullied as consumers of online platforms. 
31.  Tyler Clementi Foundation’s Youth Ambassadors are members from high 
schools across the country who work to prevent bullying and cyberbullying within their 
schools and local communities. Youth Ambassadors serve for a one-year period. Upon 
information, several Youth Ambassadors have used, or are currently using, Defendants’ 
apps: Snapchat, YOLO, and LMK. 
32. In addition to the Foundation’s flagship bullying-prevention and education 
program #Day1, the Foundation runs other programs including the Upstander Pledge, 
Upstander Speaker Series, Tyler’s Suite, and True Faith Doesn’t Bully, a public education 
campaign that fights religious bullying.  
33. Tyler Clementi Foundation has engaged in extensive advocacy efforts 
propelling the introduction of bills in Congress that would prevent bullying and 
cyberbullying. Tyler Clementi Higher Education Anti-Harassment Act was introduced in 
Congress in 2011 and re-introduced in every congressional session, most recently in 2019. 
This bill would require colleges and universities receiving federal funding to prohibit 
harassment based on actual or perceived race, color, national origin, sex, disability, sexual 


































orientation, gender identity or religion. 
34. Tyler Clementi Foundation organizes research and education programs on 
cyberbullying harms and prevention, including but not limited to gathering and maintaining 
statistics on bullying, educating the public about online civility, creating campaigns and 
toolkits for online and offline bullying prevention (#Day1), and collaborating with Youth 
Ambassadors to create and connect with a community of Upstanders. 
35. Specifically, by researching and creating the 2020 Cyber Safety Guides and 
cyber safety campaigns such as “#Keepitcool,” Tyler Clementi Foundation helps the public 
understand the importance of safety on social media and online platforms and de-escalating 
incivility that occur. According to the Foundation’s research, “84 percent of Americans 
have experienced incivility first-hand and 69 percent believe that social media and the 
internet are to blame.”10  
36. Tyler Clementi Foundation’s cyberbullying prevention work includes 
conducting the Survey of New York City Teens developed in collaboration with AT&T’s 
Corporate Social Responsibility initiative in 2016 and 2018.11 That survey was comprised 
of 500 teens, 500 parents of teens, and 500 millennial parents of younger children in New 
York City. Most recently, Tyler Clementi Foundation has engaged in survey and data 
 
10 Keep it Cool by Building Online Civility, TYLER CLEMENTI FOUNDATION, July 18, 2017, at 
https://tylerclementi.org/bullying-prevention-through-building-online-civility/   
11 Tyler Clementi Foundation Emphasizes Early Bullying Prevention Efforts Following AT&T Survey on Cyberbullying, 
Online Behavior, TYLER CLEMENTI FOUNDATION, Nov. 28, 2018, at https://tylerclementi.org/tyler-clementi-foundation-
emphasizes-early-bullying-prevention-efforts-following-att-survey-on-cyberbullying-online-behavior/  


































collection efforts to investigate the impact of social media platforms and anonymity-based 
platforms on teenagers’ mental health. 
37. In 2016, Tyler Clementi Foundation worked with teenagers in New York City 
in collaboration with AT&T and the All-American High School Film Festival to educate 
people about the effects of bullying and cyberbullying.  
38. Between 2015 and 2020, Tyler Clementi Foundation’s founders and staff 
devoted time and resources to speak at more than 180 nationwide events, educating and 
advocating on behalf of minors and parents about combatting bullying and cyberbullying. 
39.  As a result of Defendants’ legal violations, Tyler Clementi Foundation has 
suffered injury in fact. Tyler Clementi Foundation has expended its resources to address 
the harms that arise from the use of Defendants’ anonymous messaging apps. 
40. If Defendants were to cease their unlawful conduct alleged herein, Plaintiff 
Tyler Clementi Foundation would avoid diverting part of their organizational resources to 
educate the consumers and the public about the surreptitious harms arising from 
Defendants’ apps, and the Foundation could redirect these resources to other projects in 
furtherance of its mission. 
The Defendants 
 
41. Defendant Snap Inc. (“Snap Inc.”) is a Delaware Corporation with its 
principal place of business in Santa Monica, California, doing business in California as 
Snapchat Inc. Each of the DOES 1-10 is the agent, servant, partner, joint-venturer, co-


































venturer, “media partner,” principal, director, officer, manager, employee, or shareholder 
of one or more of its co-defendant(s) who aided, abetted, controlled, and directed or 
conspired with and acted in furtherance of said conspiracy with one or more of its co-
defendant(s) in said co-defendant(s) performance of the acts and omissions described 
below. Plaintiffs sue each of these Doe Defendants by these fictitious names because 
Plaintiffs do not know these Defendants’ true names and capacities. Despite reasonable 
efforts, Plaintiffs have not been able to ascertain the identity of DOES 1-10. 
42. Defendant Yolo Technologies, Inc. (formerly Popshow, Inc.) is a Delaware 
corporation with its headquarters and principal place of business in Los Angeles, 
California. Yolo Technologies, Inc. is the developer of the app YOLO. Each of the DOES 
1-10 is the agent, servant, partner, joint-venturer, co-venturer, “media partner,” principal, 
director, officer, manager, employee, or shareholder of one or more of its co-defendant(s) 
who aided, abetted, controlled, and directed or conspired with and acted in furtherance of 
said conspiracy with one or more of its co-defendant(s) in said co-defendant(s) 
performance of the acts and omissions described below. Plaintiffs sue each of these Doe 
Defendants by these fictitious names because Plaintiffs do not know these Defendants' true 
names and capacities. Despite reasonable efforts, Plaintiffs have not been able to ascertain 
the identity of DOES 1-20. 
43. Upon information and belief, Defendant LightSpace, Inc., is a Cayman Island 
corporation with its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California. Each of the DOES 


































1-10 is the agent, servant, partner, joint-venturer, co-venturer, “media partner,” principal, 
director, officer, manager, employee, or shareholder of one or more of its co-defendant(s) 
who aided, abetted, controlled, and directed or conspired with and acted in furtherance of 
said conspiracy with one or more of its co-defendant(s) in said co-defendant(s) 
performance of the acts and omissions described below. Plaintiffs sue each of these Doe 
Defendants by these fictitious names because Plaintiffs do not know these Defendants' true 
names and capacities. Despite reasonable efforts, Plaintiffs have not been able to ascertain 
the identity of DOES 1-20. 
44. Plaintiffs further allege that each and all of the Defendants are directly liable 
and/or vicariously, jointly and severally liable for the violations of state consumer 
protection laws and other tort law claims alleged herein. 
45. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs and/or those associated with Plaintiffs used the 
features of the Defendants’ apps which includes the anonymous messaging features 
enabled through YOLO or LMK on Snapchat. 
46. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ conduct directly affects millions of 
users to whom each Defendant owe a legal duty of care and to whom each Defendant is 
directly responsible for damages and the injuries caused. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
 
47. This Court has diversity jurisdiction over this class action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, 


































exceeds $5,000,000 and is a class action in which some members of the class are citizens 
of states different from the states where Defendants are citizens. 
48. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because many of 
the acts and transactions giving rise to this action occurred in this District as Defendants 
are: (a) authorized to conduct business in this District and has intentionally availed itself 
to the laws and markets within this District through the promotion, marketing, distribution 
and sale of its products in this District; (b) currently conducting substantial business in this 
District; and (c) are subject to personal jurisdiction in this District. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
 
Snapchat, LMK and YOLO apps 
 
49. Snapchat is an American multimedia messaging app developed by Snap Inc. 
One of the principal features of Snapchat is that pictures and messages are typically only 
available for a short period of time. In October 2013, the app evolved from its original 
focus on person-to-person photo sharing to featuring users’ “Stories,” content that is 
available to a user’s in-app friends for 24 hours.  
50. YOLO and LMK are apps on “Snap Kits” – third-party apps reviewed, vetted, 
and integrated for use on Snapchat so that users can access the third-party app’s features 
on Snapchat’s platform. 
51. Through Snap Kit, new apps like YOLO and LMK can instantly gain access 
to millions of Snapchat’s teen users. 


































52. YOLO and LMK are Snap Kit apps designed to allow Snapchat users to send 
messages anonymously. Predominantly used by teens, the apps allow teens to chat, 
exchange questions and answers, and send polling requests to one another on a completely 
anonymous basis – that is, the receiver of a message will not know the sender’s account 
names, nicknames, online IDs, phone numbers, nor any other identifying information 
unless the sender “reveals” himself or herself by “swiping up” in the app.  
 
Inherently Dangerous, Defective Design of Anonymous Apps 
 
53. As stated in paragraphs 1 through 19 of this Complaint, the dangers associated 
with anonymous apps were widely reported throughout the news, media reports, petitions, 
and direct notifications by consumers which were directed at, or available to Defendants.  
54. When anonymity is involved, it reinforces depersonalization which leads to 
an increase in antinormative behavior and decrease in bystander intervention. A well-
regarded study has found that “the perceived anonymity of the bystander [was] negatively 
related to their propensity to intervene.”12 Also, the perceived invisibility of the 
communicators can often lead to antinormative behavior” because the anonymity 
reinforces “depersonalization” (i.e., the inability to tell “who is who” online). According 
to the study, “depersonalization” happens in “online environments in which people are 
interacting with people they already know in a face-to-face context,” as opposed to the 
 
12 N. Brody & A.L. Vangelisti, Bystander Intervention in Cyberbullying, COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS, 83:1, 94 (2016). 


































traditional sense of anonymity where people may be complete strangers to one another.13 
55. Well-cited studies reveal that “[a]nonymity has a more negative impact on the 
victim. Adolescents believed that the anonymous situation is more serious and has more of 
a negative impact on the victim.” 14 The negative feelings that a victim feels is amplified 
when the bullying is anonymous, because the aggressor’s intentions and perceptions are 
even more difficult to determine. Adolescents believe that anonymity allows individuals to 
behave in ways they might not otherwise (e.g., engage in cyberbullying) since they can 
remain anonymous and have more power.15 
56. Leading experts who have spent years studying the causes and effects of 
bullying found that certain apps are a “one-stop shop for the bully” because everything 
they need is there: an audience, anonymity, an emphasis on appearances, and channels that 
range from public feeds to behind-the-back group chats.16 All of these factors exist on the 
Defendants’ apps.  
57. According to studies, significant challenges remain in the detection and 
mitigation of cyberbullying. While tech firms may incorporate human labor and/or 
machine-based methods to detect cyberbullying, human labor is costly and machine-based 
 
13 Id.(earlier version of the study available at https://www.natcom.org/sites/default/files/pages/NCA_Anti-
Bullying_Resources_Brody.pdf, p. 20.) 
14 B. Mascotto, Exploring the impact of anonymity on cyberbullying in adolescents: an integrative literature review, 
UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA (2015), available at 
https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/5986/Mascotto_Brooke_MN_2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y  
15 Id.  
16 Katy Steinmetz, Inside Instagram’s War on Bullying, TIME, July 8, 2019, https://time.com/5619999/instagram-mosseri-
bullying-artificial-intelligence/  


































detection are technologically infeasible to be effective. In particular, machine-based 
methods of sifting through contents are largely inaccurate due to the varied role and context 
of communication, ever-changing texts and visual lexicon of speech, the latency of the 
detection and mitigation after users’ exposure to harm, and the challenge of scalability 
applied to a high volume of users.  
58. Particularly, anonymous apps pose unique challenges in detecting bullying 
and harassing behavior, because the anonymity renders the construction of the users’ 
relationships nearly impossible.17  
59. According to reports, technology firms and social media firms are reluctant to 
hire staff to detect and take action to address bullying incidents due to the high cost of 
employing labor and resources.18  
60. While many apps put the burden on the users to block and report abusive 
behavior on mobile platforms, this does not safeguard vulnerable teens from harm because 
they have already been exposed to the harmful, hateful, and inappropriate messages. To 
prevent harm, the apps must enforce their own rule that deters abusive users by reporting 
to authorities and parents, revealing their identities and banning them from the apps. 
Cyberbullying and Teen Suicide 
 
61. Experts have found that students who experienced bullying and/or 
 
17 Chelmis, C. & Zois, D., Characterization, Detection, and Mitigation of Cyberbullying [Tutorial], ICWSM U. ALBANY 
(2018), available at http://www.cs.albany.edu/~cchelmis/icwsm2018tutorial/CyberbullyingTutorial_ICWSM2018.pdf  
18 Why Content Moderation Costs Billions and is So Tricky for Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and other, CNBC, Feb. 27, 2021, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/27/content-moderation-on-social-media.html  


































cyberbullying are nearly two times more likely to attempt suicide.19 Victims of 
cyberbullying are at a greater risk than non-victims of both self-harm and suicidal 
behaviors.20 
62. According to the Pew Research Center, 59% of U.S. teenagers have been 
bullied or harassed online.21 80 percent of teenagers who responded to the survey believed 
that the platforms and messaging apps were not doing enough to prevent bullying and 
harassment online.  In this way, teenagers themselves believed that apps should be 
responsible for preventing bullying on online platforms. 
63. The mobile app companies are in the best position to prevent cyberbullying 
and enforce safeguards, because users interact within the apps’ platforms instead of within 
classrooms where traditional bullying had occurred. According to reports, teen victims are 
less likely to report to parents and school officials about cyberbullying incidents because 
they worry that adults would then restrict their access to their mobile devices.22 Teens also 
fear that they would get into trouble themselves if they had already been warned to stay off 
electronic devices or social media. Moreover, teens are concerned that if they report to 
 
19 Hinduja, Sameer & Patchin, Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Suicide. ARCHIVES OF SUICIDE RESEARCH : OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY FOR SUICIDE RESEARCH (2010), available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45289246_Bullying_Cyberbullying_and_Suicide.  
20 John A, Glendenning AC, Marchant A, Montgomery P, Stewart A, Wood S, Lloyd K, Hawton K, Self-Harm, Suicidal 
Behaviours, and Cyberbullying in Children and Young People: Systematic Review, J MED INTERNET RES (2018);20(4):e129 
doi: 10.2196/jmir.9044 
21 A Majority of Teens have Experienced Some Form of Cyberbullying, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/09/27/a-majority-of-teens-have-experienced-some-form-of-cyberbullying/  
22 Why Victims of Bullying Often Suffer in Silence (Feb. 27, 2021), VERYWELL FAMILY, 
https://www.verywellfamily.com/reasons-why-victims-of-bullying-do-not-tell-460784  


































adults, the bullying will exacerbate or that their aggressors would retaliate.23  
64. During the COVID-19 pandemic, as of June 2020, 62 percent of parents of 
U.S. teens aged 14-17 years stated their children were spending more than 4 hours per day 
on electronic devices, nearly a two-fold increase compared to the pre-pandemic times when 
only 32 percent of parents of U.S. teens aged 14-17 years were spending more than 4 hours 
per day on electronic devices.24 Upon information and belief, Defendants’ apps thrived and 
profited throughout the pandemic given the surge of users’ time spent on their apps.  
Carson Bride’s Death Caused by Cyberbullying 
 
65. According to his family and friends, Carson Bride was a teenager who had 
“an infectious smile that would brighten everyone’s day.” When he passed away from 
suicide on June 23, 2020, he was 16 years old and had just completed his sophomore year 
in high school. He was a caring and compassionate teenager who taught ski classes to 
children during winters.  
66. Carson took his own life by hanging himself at his home on the morning of 
June 23, 2020.  
67. On or about July 4, 2020, it was revealed that Carson had been bullied on 
Defendants’ apps Snapchat, YOLO and LMK prior to his suicide.  
68. After Carson ended his life, two psychologists who provided care to Carson 
 
23 Id.  
24 Internet Demographics and Use, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1189204/us-teens-children-screen-time-
daily-coronavirus-before-during/  


































and his family opined that Carson’s suicide was triggered by cyberbullying.  
69. Carson’s parents did not consent nor were present when their son Carson 
downloaded the Defendants’ apps and presumably agreed to their Terms of Use.  
70. The Defendants purport to enter in to their Terms of Service with minors who 
lack the capacity to enter in to contracts in the first place. 
71. Carson’s mother, Kristin Bride, on behalf of her deceased son Carson Bride, 
hereby disaffirms the Terms of Use, Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, and/or EULA 
agreements between her son and each all of Defendants as it relates to their apps. 
 
Cyberbullying on YOLO Anonymous Messaging App 
 
72. Released in May 2019, YOLO (which stands for the phrase “You Only Live 
Once”) is an anonymous question-and-answer app.  
73. YOLO launched on Snap Kit which enables the app to be integrated and used 
on Snapchat. YOLO users can create a content Q&A post. Incoming questions would 
appear in the YOLO app, but users must go back to Snapchat to answer them.  
74. Upon information and belief, from January 23, 2020 to June 22, 2020, Carson 
received 105 messages via YOLO. He received 35 anonymous messages between January 
23, 2020 and January 29, 2020. Carson received 13 anonymous messages from May 25, 
2020 to May 31, 2020. The anonymous messages Carson received surged from June 7, 
2020 to June 22, 2020, just prior to his death, during which time Carson received 57 


































messages from anonymous users on YOLO.  
75. Upon information and belief, of the 105 anonymous messages Carson 
received via YOLO, 62 messages included content that was meant to humiliate him, often 
involving sexually explicit and disturbing content.  
76. On May 31, 2020, messages sent to Carson included threats:  
 “Remember when someone threatened to push u [Carson] into the Grand 
Canyon, that shit was so funny”  
 “I’m gonna push u [Carson] into the Grand Canyon.”  
77. Later, on June 7, 2020, Carson received the following messages after an 
incident where he had fainted during his biology class: “When u passed out in Biology I 
put my balls in ur mouth” and “When you passed out I ate your ass.” 
78. Upon information and belief, 27 out of 105 YOLO messages involved 
catfishing, a deceptive activity where a person creates a fake identity on a social platform, 
usually targeting a specific victim for abuse. These messages are also sexually explicit in 
nature, including “are you a virgin”; “I WANT YOUR WEINER NOWWWW”; and 
“Sometimes I print ur face out and throw darts at it…but others I just want ur tender love 
in the night.”  
79. Upon information and belief, on June 7, 2020, after receiving numerous 
abusive, harassing, and upsetting messages on YOLO, Carson searched YOLO’s website 
and other websites searching for “YOLO reveal,” “YOLO username reveal hacks,” and 


































other keyword searches in an effort to find out who was sending abusive messages to him.  
80. Upon information and belief, Carson relied on YOLO’s misrepresentation that 
YOLO would reveal the identities of the aggressors.  
81. In responding to numerous abusive messages, Carson asked the anonymous 
users sending him abusive messages to voluntarily “S/U” (Swipe Up) to reveal their 
identities. None of the users chose to reveal themselves.   
82. On or about June 13, 2020, 10 days before his death, Carson asked a friend 
via text message about the identities of the anonymous senders: “Do you know who is 
sending me all these sus(picious) YOLOs. Whenever I do one I only get people either 
trying to catfish me or bait me into saying dumb (things) or whatever . . . I guess I 
understand like a bit of sus(picious) shit every once in a while but it [is] my entire inbox 
of YOLO’s.”  
83. On June 21 and 22, 2020, Carson posted his final Snapchat story about starting 
a summer job at Papa Murphy’s pizza restaurant: “Pull up to Papa Murphy’s at 3-5 on 
Wednesday [i]f you wanna see me working”; “Come to Papa Murphy’s and order Pizza.” 
84. On June 21 and 22, 2020, Carson received anonymous responses to his 
Snapchat story via YOLO: “why do you make my peepee so hard”; “How big is your 
penis”; “How big are your balls.” 
85. Upon information and belief, on June 23, 2020, the morning of Carson’s 
death, the last web history found from his phone shows that Carson was again searching 


































“Reveal YOLO Username Online” which reflects his final painstaking attempt to find out 
who was sending abusive YOLO messages to him. 
86. YOLO developed, designed, and distributed the anonymous messaging 
feature to minor users, despite the known dangers and the foreseeability of injury and 
wrongful deaths caused by its services. In this way, YOLO failed to exercise the duty of 
care owed to Carson and other users. 
YOLO’s Misrepresentations 
 
87. On the Google Play store, YOLO is accompanied by a “Teen” content rating, 
intentionally focusing its marketing and solicitation toward teenagers.25 According to 
Google Play Help, the content ratings in the app store “are the responsibility of the app 
developers.” Users are not required to input their date of birth or age verification process 




25 Google Play Help, Apps & Games Content Ratings on Google Play: 
https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/6209544?p=appgame_ratings&visit_id=637560335067969325-
3904586056&rd=1 


































88. When a user first opens YOLO after downloading it from the Apple or Google 
app store, a pop-up notice fills the screen: “By using YOLO you agree the terms of service 
(EULA) and privacy policy. YOLO has no tolerance for objectionable content or abusive 
users. You’ll be banned for any inappropriate behavior.”  
 
89. On the first screen of the user’s interface with the app, YOLO states, “No 
bullying. If you send harassing messages to our users, your identity will be revealed.”  
 


































90. The YOLO App Store page also states: “Be kind, respectful, show compassion 
with other users, otherwise you will be banned.”  
 
91. In the most visible places, YOLO falsely represented it would take concrete 
actions to enforce safeguards: that the abusive users’ accounts will be banned and their 
identities will be revealed.  
92. However, abusive users remain anonymous and active on the YOLO platform 
even after victims have repeatedly reported inappropriate content or harassment and asked 
for their identities to be revealed.  
93. According to Apple Store’s user reviews, YOLO routinely ignores requests 
by consumers to ban or reveal the identity of users engaging in harassing or bullying 


































behavior, even when users have reported death threats and suicidal thoughts: 
 ******, 09/13/2020: “This app does not prevent bullying. It says above 
every YOLO question that any user will get banned from the app if they 
say anything considered as bullying. Well, I am very disappointed 
because I have seen more than enough users’ telling children to “kill 
themselves.” I personally know one child that had these messages 
coming in repeatedly for months, and is still getting them to this day. 
The child had even had many suicidal thoughts and actions.” 
 
 *****, 05/16/2019: “I’ve gotten disgusting messages that I’ve reported 
and waited to see whose name it would be so I know on my Snapchat 
who to delete but how would I know if they don’t reveal the names 
instantly. When I reported this issue I pressed the report button and the 
conversation deleted but no name shows up so I still believe that 
whoever is on my Snapchat is still on my friends list . . .” 
 
 ******dove, 3/25/2020: “it says that only positive messages are 
allowed and that if you bully or harass someone you will be banned 
from yolo. But I have gotten messages where I have been bullied and 
that person was not banned. . .” 
 
 ******, 11/18/2019: “My daughter has been getting bullied on this app 
and we report/block, and this bully keeps on going and it’s about 
suicide! . . . If someone truly reports someone this nasty on the app, it 
should be dealt with instantly!!” 
 
 Briggs ****, 02/17/2020: “At a time when suicide is the number 1 killer 
of teens in America, we definitely don’t need apps like this where 
bullied haters can hide behind a screen . . .” 
 
 Ieila****: 01/14/2021: “Honestly, the hate and death threats . . . on this 
app should be immediately taken care or when we report something 
someone has anonymously said.” 
 
 Uhohsp***: 08/10/2020: “In a few group chats people have been using 
the ghost messages to cyberbully people by calling them fat, ugly, gross 
and such and sometimes even to kill themselves. . . I think it would be 
practical that if someone sends an outrageous message like that, getting 


































flags would result in a ban? . . .  these messages hurt. I am a pre-teen 
and I know kids my age are going to take these comments personally. I 
just want everyone to stay safe.”   
 
94. According to one review, YOLO’s failure to unmask and ban abusive users 
from the platform encourages bullying behavior: 
 Nicole *******, 09/29/2019: “it’s teaching our youth that it’s okay to hide 
behind a screen and bully. So if someone want to say something nice, they 
should say it to them directly, not through an anon[ymous] messaging app 
where people are constantly getting hurt and bullied . . .” 
 
95. If YOLO had followed its own stated policy and revealed the identities or 
banned abusive users, more users would be deterred from engaging in harassing or bullying 
because they would know they would be held accountable for their actions.  
96. YOLO’s anonymous app hinders parents, guardians, and educators from 
taking action because they do not know who the sender of the message might be.  
97. YOLO’s own privacy policy states that it collects personally identifiable 
information to “protect and enforce our rights and the rights of other Users against unlawful 
activity, including identify theft and fraud, and other violations of our Terms of Use.” The 
Terms of use reiterates its zero-tolerance policy toward bullying and harassment.  
98. Despite its representations to consumers, YOLO is unable and/or unwilling to 
detect content that constitutes bullying, harassing, and inappropriate comments. YOLO is 
also unable and/or unwilling to ban abusive users which contradicts their own stated 
policies and guidelines.  


































99. Upon information and belief, Carson relied on the misrepresentations of 
YOLO that it would ban and reveal identities of users engaging in bullying and harassing 
behavior. Many users like Carson relied on these representations. According to the 
customer reviews (paras. 93-94), many users made reports to YOLO to unmask identities 
or block abusive users but received no resolution nor any response. 
100. Contrary to the representation that YOLO would ban and reveal users who are 
engaging in bullying and harassment, YOLO failed to identify, detect, prevent, protect, or 
otherwise take any action to prevent the harm that Carson suffered using the YOLO app. 
YOLO’s misrepresentations were material and resulted in the injury suffered by Carson 
and other consumers. 
101. Carson’s estate is therefore entitled to compensatory and punitive damages 
for intentionally causing physical and emotional pain and distress suffered by Carson Bride 
in the months leading to his death, and the pecuniary loss and loss of society, 
companionship, services and expenses incurred, in the amount that the jury may determine 
fair and reasonable.  
YOLO’s Non-Response to Kristin Bride 
 
102. On or around July 6, 2020, two weeks after Carson’s death, his parents Kristin 
and Tom Bride contacted YOLO’s app developers. Using the Contact Us form on YOLO’s 
Customer Support page, Kristin and Tom wrote about the cyberbullying that occurred on 
YOLO and their son’s resulting death.  


































103. In the message to YOLO, Kristin and Tom Bride conveyed the urgency about 
this topic, expressing that YOLO must reveal the abusive users’ identities to protect other 
children from the same harm that happened to her son.  
104.  To date, YOLO has not responded.  
105. On September 26, 2020, approximately three months after Carson’s death, 
Carson’s parents again sent an email entitled “Our Son’s Suicide – Request for Help” to 
the law enforcement email address (lawenforcement@onyolo.com) provided by YOLO for 
reporting emergencies. Carson’s parents expected that sending an email to the “law 
enforcement” address might prompt a timely response. 
106. In the email, Carson’s parents included details about the abusive messages 
that anonymous YOLO users had sent to Carson prior to his death. In addition, Carson’s 
parents wrote: 
“Clearly, no one was policing YOLO when my son received hundreds of abusive 
messages during the first 3 weeks of June. These offenders may very well be 
continuing their bullying practices, especially now that they know the power of 
their words. For this reason, we are requesting the contacts of every 
SnapChat/YOLO anonymous user who sent a message to my son’s SnapChat 
account [] during the month of June 2020 . . . If you create an app which provides a 
platform for the anonymous bullying of vulnerable teens, the very least you can do 
is take accountability and assist the parents of your app’s victims so that more 
YOLO deaths do not occur.” 
 
107. The email sent to the email address “lawenforcement@onyolo.com” 
immediately bounced back displaying the following error message: “The following 
recipient(s) cannot be reached” due to “invalid address.”  


































108. YOLO again misrepresented and/or implied that it would provide users a way 
to contact them to report any issues that relate to law enforcement, when in fact, YOLO 
did not even maintain such an email account.  
109. Kristin simultaneously sent the same message to YOLO’s Customer Support, 
which was returned with an automated response, stating “We’re currently checking your 
message and will respond as soon as we can.”  
110. To date, no one from YOLO’s Support Team has responded. 
111. On December 16, 2020, Kristin once again tried to reach YOLO’s team 
through the help of Josh Golin, Executive Director of the organization Campaign for a 
Commercial-Free Childhood, who directly contacted Gregoire Henrion (Co-founder and 
CEO of YOLO) through LinkedIn, a social media site for professional networks, 
demanding that YOLO provide a response to Kristin and Tom Bride.  
112. To date, no one from YOLO has responded.  
113.   On December 30, 2020, Kristin again contacted YOLO’s team through 
YOLO’s “Contact Us” form and email (lawenforcement@onyolo.com).  
114. To date, no one from YOLO has responded.  
115. Contrary to its representations in its Terms of Use and other policies, YOLO 
failed to protect, communicate, and respond to reports from its teen users and their parents. 
116. Reasonably relying on the misrepresentations of YOLO with respect to its 
protection of users, Kristin Bride used YOLO’s service and suffered injury in fact.   


































117. Kristin is therefore entitled to compensatory damages for physical and 
emotional pain and distress in the amount that the jury may determine fair and reasonable.  
118. Kristin is also entitled to injunctive relief and punitive damages for the gross, 
continued, and callous misrepresentations and non-response of Defendant YOLO even 
after being notified of Carson’s death multiple times.  
Cyberbullying on LMK Anonymous Messaging App 
 
119. LMK is an anonymous Question and Answer and polling app that integrates 
with Snapchat through Snap Kit. LMK users can create and customize stickers and 
backgrounds while sharing polls with their friends on Snapchat. Other users vote 
anonymously and the user who posted the poll can share results on Snapchat.  
120. From January 23, 2020 to June 22, 2020, Carson received numerous messages 
on LMK.  
121. On June 21 to 22, 2020, Carson received the following messages on LMK: 
“Ayo where is the horse cock bb”; “Yes daddy harder daddy”; “hi babygirl do you wanna 
have a threesome sometime?”; “My WiFi sucks so I just flick the bean to ur Bitmoji”; “Do 
them every week pls daddy I got a hard on for your reply’s just let my gf watch u and flick 
her bean.” 
122.  On June 21, 2020, Carson stated in a private message to his friend on LMK: 
“for some reason whenever I do one of these [posts]” people send messages containing 
sexually explicit and harassing comments such as “beanflickers.”  


































123. LMK maintained, developed, and distributed anonymous features which are 
dangerous, despite the foreseeability of injury and wrongful death caused by its services to 
teen users. LMK failed to take action to enforce its purported zero-tolerance policies 
against bullying and harassing behavior, failed to monitor and report bullying and harassing 
behavior to law enforcement, and failed to prohibit sexually explicit and inappropriate texts 
and photos sent to young users as they promised in their stated policies and guidance. In 
this way, they have failed to exercise the duty of care owed to its users including Carson. 
LMK’s Misrepresentations 
 
124. On Google Play Store, LMK is accompanied by a “Teen” content rating sign, 
indicating that the app is marketed toward teenage users. According to Google Play, 
content ratings are the responsibility of app developers.26  
 
125. According to the LMK’s Guidelines, LMK does “not tolerate any sexually 
explicit content. This includes content in the form of text, photo, and video.”  LMK 
 
26  Google Play Help, Apps & Games Content Ratings on Google Play, 
https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/6209544?p=appgame_ratings&visit_id=637560335067969325-
3904586056&rd=1  


































represented that it “does not tolerate ANY objectionable content or abusive users.”27  
126. LMK’s Terms of Use states that it will not tolerate any user who is “mean, is 
bullying someone or is intended to harass, scare or upset anyone.” It expressly represents: 
“LMK does not tolerate ANY objectionable content or abusive users. Any objectionable 
content posted on LMK will be reviewed by our Content Safety team.” “Reports of 
stalking, threats, bullying, or intimidation, are taken very seriously and may be reported to 
law enforcement.” 
127. According to LMK’s Privacy Policy, LMK collects information about “how 
[users] communicate with other users on LMK, such as their names, the time and date of 
your communications, the number of messages [users] exchange with your friends, which 
friends [users] exchange messages with the most, and [the user’s] interactions with 
messages (such as when [users] open a message or capture a screenshot).”28  
128. LMK represented that it would “go to great lengths to protect our community 
from ‘inappropriate users’ by implementing various technology and moderation practices 
including: Artificial intelligence technology to identify potentially inappropriate content 
within text . . . human moderation to assess whether content or user violates our 
Community Guidelines.”29  
129. According to the above representations -- that LMK collects a wide variety of 
 
27 Guidelines, LMK, at https://www.lmk.chat/guidelines  
28 Privacy Policy, LMK, https://www.lmk.chat/privacy  
29 What is LMK doing to ensure safety within the app?, LMK Support Center, https://lmk.zendesk.com/hc/en-
us/articles/360047469394-What-is-LMK-doing-to-ensure-safety-within-the-app-  


































private data of minor users and uses artificial intelligence technology and human labor to 
discern whether contents are harmful -- LMK would have known that teen users, including 
Carson, were receiving sexually explicit contents, bullying, and harassing messages.  
130. Despite its knowledge of bullying, LMK did not report the incident to the 
police, did not enforce its “no tolerance” policy, and did not prohibit sexually explicit 
content.  
131. LMK represents that it is collecting a wide variety of information about the 
users that would reveal their age and contents exchanged, including: “names of other users, 
time and date of communications, number of messages you exchange with your friends . . . 
content information, usage information, location information, and phonebooks.”  
132. Despite its representations to consumers, LMK is unable and/or unwilling to 
detect behavior that constitute bullying, harassing, and inappropriate comments by users 
per its own policies and guidelines.  
133. Upon information and belief, Carson relied on the misrepresentations of 
LMK, that it would prohibit sexual content (text, photo, and video) and report threats, 
bullying or intimidation. These misrepresentations were material and resulted in the injury 
suffered by Carson and other consumers.  
134. Carson’s estate is therefore entitled to compensatory and punitive damages 
for intentionally causing physical and emotional pain and distress suffered by Carson Bride 
in the months leading to his death, and the pecuniary loss and loss of society, 


































companionship, services and expenses incurred, in the amount that the jury may determine 
fair and reasonable.  
135. Putative class members would use LMK’s services in the future which entitles 
them to injunctive relief. Putative class members are also entitled to compensatory 
damages, restitution, and punitive damages in the amount that the jury may determine fair 
and reasonable. 
 
Cyberbullying on Snapchat and Misrepresentations regarding Snap Kits 
 
136. Snapchat is a software service by Snap Inc. that provides a mobile app 
allowing consumers to send and receive photo and video messages. Snapchat markets itself 
as a messaging app in which contents are posted for a short time before they disappear 
from users’ view.   
137. Market and consumer data company Statista found that, as of June 2020, 
66.5% of Snapchat users in the United States were between 12 and 17 years of age, making 
it the No. 1 app used among teenagers.30  Since the spring of 2016, Snapchat consistently 
ranks as the most popular social network for teenagers in the United States.  Yet, 31% of 
young people experienced cyberbullying on Snapchat.31  
138. The age rating for Snapchat is 13, but there is no age verification procedure 
 
30 Most popular social networks of teenagers in the United States from fall 2012 to fall 2020, Statista, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/250172/social-network-usage-of-us-teens-and-young-adults/ 
31 Id.  


































in the sign-up process.   
139. Snap Kit is Snap Inc.’s platform which allows third-party apps to use Snapchat 
features. Snap Kit grants third-party apps access to Snapchat’s Application Programming 
Interface (API). Third-party apps on Snap Kit can allow users to user their Snapchat 
credentials to log-in.  
140. Snap Inc. benefits from Snap Kit by bringing new users to Snapchat via third-
party apps while reengaging existing users by offering a variety of third-party, add-on 
services. Third-party app developers benefit through Snap Kit by generating referral traffic 
by tapping into Snapchat’s more than 280 million teen users world-wide.32  
141. Since on or around May 2019, both LMK and YOLO were approved by Snap 
Inc. to be used on Snapchat through Snap Kit. Both apps are also advertised for “teens” 
and provide a platform for anonymous chat, polling, and Q&A.  
142. Upon information and belief, YOLO and LMK’s users are predominantly 
teens. 
143. Developers of third-party apps seeking access to Snap Kit must pass a human 
review and approval process, and Snap Inc. reviews the functionality of the other apps to 
ensure they satisfy Snap Inc.’s standards. Snap Inc.’s approval process is meant to retain 
control over the third-party app’s operations. Snap Inc.’s trust, safety and customer 
 
32 Josh Constine, Snapchat launches privacy-safe Snap Kit, the un-Facebook Platform, TechCrunch, June 14, 2018, at 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/14/snapchat-snap-kit/  


































operations teams review the third-party apps before they approve them for Snap Kit access. 
Snap Inc. represented that, if Snap Inc.’s review teams have any concerns about a third-
party app’s “security or intentions,” the third-party app is denied access to Snap Kit.33  
144. According to Snap Kit App Review Guidelines, third-party apps that 
“[e]ncourag[e] or promot[e] violence, harassment, bullying, hate speech, threats, and/or 
self-harm” are considered “unacceptable.” Unacceptable features or content include 
“inadequate safeguards in place to prevent this type of behavior.”34  
145. Per the Snap Kit App Review Guidelines, to access Snap Kit, all third-party 
apps “containing user generated content must have the ability to report inappropriate 
content and have a contact method made available to users. The developer team should be 
able to swiftly and effectively handle any concerns raised about the safety of users.”35 
146. Snap Inc. states that if a third-party app violates the Review Guidelines or 
contains unacceptable features or content, Snap Inc. will remove the third-party app. One 
example of unacceptable features include: “Encouraging or promoting violence, 
harassment, bullying, hate speech, threats, and/or self-harm. This also includes inadequate 
safeguards in place to prevent this type of behavior.” 36  
147. According to Snap Kit’s Review Guidelines, where an app contains potential 
 
33 Lauren Goode, Snap Will Let Other Apps Use Its Features, But Not Your Data, WIRED, June 14, 2018, 
https://www.wired.com/story/snap-kit/ 
34 Snap Kit App Review Guidelines, https://kit.snapchat.com/docs/review-guidelines  
35 Id.  
36 Id. 


































trust and safety issues, including “user-generated content, anonymous postings . . . or an 
audience that includes minors” the app would be subject to longer and on-going review 
processes.  
148. Snap Inc. states that it would take negative user feedback in to account in 
reviewing third-party apps. 37 
149. Additionally, Snap Kit’s Review Guidelines state, “[a]ll apps must conform 
with local laws and regulations in the jurisdiction where they are available.”38 Almost all 
states and territories in the U.S. has Anti-Bullying laws that prohibit bullying and require 
reporting incidents, prevention methods, and safeguards.39 
150. Upon information and belief, none of the promises and policies stated by Stan 
Inc. above are enforced. 
151. Both LMK and YOLO were subject to Snap Kit’s Review Guidelines and 
periodic review processes. But despite LMK and YOLO’s defectively designed 
anonymous messaging features that were known to promote cyberbullying and harassment 
among users, Snap Inc. did not remove them from Snap Kit. 
152. Snap Inc. knew about the dangers of anonymous apps that promote 
cyberbullying, because similar problems had surfaced when Snap Inc. had previously 
 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, Policies, and Regulations, STOPBULLYING.GOV, 
https://www.stopbullying.gov/resources/laws/key-components  


































allowed the anonymous app Sarahah to be used in connection with Snapchat’s platform.40 
Sarahah app was eventually banned from Apple and Android app stores for “making 
bullying easy.”41   
153. Snap Inc. represented that third-party apps on Snap Kit are periodically re-
reviewed for compliance.42 Through numerous reports, customer complaints and negative 
feedback – which Snap Inc. purports to take into account in their review -- Snap Inc. would 
have known that the anonymous messaging apps YOLO and LMK are causing fatal harm 
and that those apps had failed to enforce safeguards. Yet, contrary to the representations in 
its Review Guidelines, Snap Inc. has not removed YOLO and LMK from its platform.  
154. Despite numerous reports of harassment, bullying, and harm suffered by 
teenagers arising from anonymous features embedded in YOLO and LMK, Snap Inc. 
reviewed, vetted, and approved YOLO and LMK to be on Snap Kit, exposing millions of 
teen users on Snapchat to these apps. Snap Inc. continues to provide YOLO and LMK 
access to its platform, users, and suite of services. 
155. Despite its representations to consumers, Snap Inc. maintained, developed, 
and distributed anonymous features together with YOLO and LMK to Snapchat’s teen 
users, despite knowledge of their dangerous and defective design.  The injuries and 
 
40 How to Link your Sarahah Account To Your Snapchat – Here’s How, BUSTLE, Aug. 10, 2017, 
https://www.bustle.com/p/how-to-link-your-sarahah-snapchat-so-your-friends-can-send-you-messages-75838 
41 Sarahah: Popular Anonymous Messaging App Blamed for Making Abuse Easy is Kicked Off iphone and Android, 
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 26, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/sarahah-banned-iphone-
android-download-app-store-down-not-working-anonymous-curious-cat-a8228941.html 
42 Snap Kit App Review Guidelines, https://kit.snapchat.com/docs/review-guidelines  


































wrongful deaths caused by anonymous apps to teen users were foreseeable, but Snap Inc. 
failed to maintain safeguards to protect users from harm. In this way, they have failed to 
exercise the duty of care owed to Snapchat users including Carson Bride.    
156. Upon information and belief, Carson relied on the misrepresentations of Snap 
Inc. that it reviewed, vetted, and approved third-party apps like YOLO and LMK, and that 
it would remove third-party apps from Snap Kit if they fail to comply with Snap’s Review 
Guidelines. These misrepresentations were material and resulted in the injury suffered by 
Carson and other consumers.  
157. Carson’s estate is therefore entitled to compensatory and punitive damages 
for intentionally causing physical and emotional pain and distress suffered by Carson Bride 
in the months leading to his death, and the pecuniary loss and loss of society, 
companionship, services and expenses incurred, in the amount that the jury may determine 
fair and reasonable.  
158. Putative class members would use Snapchat’s services in the future which 
entitles them to injunctive relief. Putative class members are also entitled to compensatory 
damages, restitution, and punitive damages, in the amount that the jury may determine fair 
and reasonable. 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
 
159. Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and Class Members 
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 


































160. Plaintiffs Carson Bride and Tyler Clementi Foundation seek to represent a 
national “Snapchat Class” defined as follows: All United States residents between the ages 
of 13 and 17, who are or were registered users of Snapchat between May 10, 2018 and the 
date of judgment in this action, excluding Defendant, Defendant’s officers, directors, and 
employees, Defendant’s subsidiaries, the Judge to which this case is assigned and the 
immediate family of the Judge to which this case is assigned. 
161. Plaintiffs Carson Bride and Tyler Clementi Foundation seek to represent a 
national “YOLO Class” defined as follows: All United States residents between the ages 
of 13 and 17, who are or were registered users of YOLO between May 1, 2019 and the date 
of judgment in this action, excluding Defendant, Defendant’s officers, directors, and 
employees, Defendant’s subsidiaries, the Judge to which this case is assigned and the 
immediate family of the Judge to which this case is assigned. 
162. Plaintiffs Carson Bride and Tyler Clementi Foundation seek to represent a 
national “LMK Class” defined as follows: All United States residents between the ages of 
13 and 17, who are or were registered users of LMK between May 1, 2019 and the date of 
judgment, excluding Defendant, Defendant’s officers, directors, and employees, 
Defendant’s subsidiaries, the Judge to which this case is assigned and the immediate family 
of the Judge to which this case is assigned. 
163. Plaintiffs reserve the right to re-define any of the Class definitions prior to 
class certification or thereafter, including after having the opportunity to conduct 



































164. Plaintiffs are members of the putative class that they seek to represent.  
165. The definition of the putative class is narrowly tailored to include only persons 
who can be identified through Defendants’ database of registered users for the discrete 
period of time from when the Defendants’ apps launched through the date of judgment in 
this action, or from the appropriate statutory limitations period through the date of 
judgment in this action. 
F.R.C.P. 23(a) 
166. The proposed class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all its 
members, in this or any action, is impracticable. The exact number or identification of the 
members of the putative class is presently unknown to Plaintiffs, but it is believed to 
comprise millions of United States residents throughout the nation, thereby making joinder 
impractical. 
167. Common questions of fact and law exist as to all Class Members. These 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(a) Whether the defective design of the anonymous messaging function was 
dangerous such that the solicitation, maintenance and distribution of the apps’ 
services constitute unfair and deceptive business practices;  
(b) Whether the representations made by each of the Defendants’ apps were 
materially misleading to consumers; 


































(c) Whether Defendants failed to carry out what they explicitly represented through 
their app store descriptions, terms of use, and privacy policy; 
(d) Whether Defendants’ conduct resulted in harm to consumers; and 
 (c) Whether Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to an injunction, damages, 
restitution, equitable relief and other relief deemed appropriate and the amount and 
nature of such relief. 
168. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the putative class members. 
Plaintiffs and all putative Class members were subject to the above misrepresentations 
made by Defendants and all have claims based on the same legal theories against the 
Defendants. 
169. The factual bases of Defendants’ misconduct are common to the putative 
Class members and represent a common scheme and pattern of practice surrounding the 
defectively designed products and services, and misrepresentations about their services and 
guidelines, and enforcement, resulting in injury to all putative class members alike. 
Plaintiffs are asserting the same rights, making the same claims, and seeking similar relief 
for themselves and all other putative class members.  
170.  Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the proposed class because they are 
putative class members and do not have interests that conflict with those of the other 
putative class members they seek to represent.  
171. Plaintiffs are represented by experienced and able counsel, who have litigated 


































lawsuits of this complexity, and Plaintiffs’ Counsel intends to prosecute this action 
vigorously for the benefit of the proposed class. Plaintiffs and their Counsel will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class members. 
Plaintiffs’ Class Seeks Certification under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) 
172. The central questions of whether Defendants’ apps were dangerous and 
defectively designed, and whether Defendants’ made misrepresentations about their 
safeguards and enforcement predominate over all other questions, both legal and factual, 
in this litigation. 
173. A class action is the superior method available for the efficient adjudication 
of this litigation because: (a) The prosecution of separate actions by individual members 
of the Class would create a foreseeable risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which 
would establish incompatible results and standards for Defendant; (b) Adjudications with 
respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of 
the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would 
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their own separate interests; (c) Class 
action treatment avoids the waste and duplication inherent in potentially thousands of 
individual actions, and conserves the resources of the courts; and (d) the claims of the 
individual class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that 
would be required to individually litigate their claims against Defendant, so it would be 
impracticable for the members of the Class to individually seek redress for Defendant’s 


































wrongful conduct. Even if the members of the Class could afford individual litigation, the 
court system could not. Moreover, this action is manageable as a class action. 
Individualized litigation creates a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and 
increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class 
action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of 
single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 
Plaintiffs’ Class Seeks Certification under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) 
 
174. A class action for injunctive and equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate. Defendant acted or refused to act 
on grounds generally applicable to the Class thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
and equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ actions are generally 
applicable to the Class as a whole, and Plaintiffs, on behalf of the Class, seeks damages 
and injunctive relief described herein. Moreover, Defendant’s systemic policy and 
practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: STRICT LIABILITY 
(Plaintiff Estate of Carson Bride Individually and on Behalf of a National Class Against 
All Defendants) 
 
175. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants directed its business activities, 
solicited the use of, and provided service to residents in Oregon, and conducted regular, 
sustained, and isolated business activity in the state of Oregon. 
176. Plaintiff Carson Bride brings this claim individually and on behalf of a 


































National class against all Defendants.  
177. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff Carson Bride was a resident of the 
state of Oregon.  
178. The acts complained of herein, and the injury suffered by Plaintiff Carson 
Bride occurred in Oregon.  
179. As alleged above, Defendants’ anonymous apps, YOLO and LMK which 
integrates with Snapchat, was unreasonably dangerous for use by teenagers, and the 
unreasonable danger was inherent in designing, maintaining, distributing the anonymous 
messaging function. 
180. At all material times, Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have known that the anonymity features on teen messaging apps that lack adequate 
safeguards pose serious danger of mental harm to teen users. Yet, Defendants failed to 
warn users about the dangers of using the service – instead, it made false promises about 
preventing harm.  
181. Defendants’ apps promoted cyberbullying and are designed to be inherently 
dangerous. LMK and YOLO are unable or unwilling to detect and identify abusive users 
who send bullying and harassing messages. These apps are also unable or unwilling to 
enforce their policies where they state they would ban, reveal, and report abusive users. 
Despite Snap Inc.’s policy of removing third-party apps from Snap Kit that are 
noncompliant, YOLO, LMK and Snapchat still lack safeguards to prevent cyberbullying. 


































By failing to enforce their stated policies, Defendants’ apps hinder victims, parents, adults, 
and schools from identifying the abusive users and undermine efforts to prevent future 
harm. Defendants’ products and services provide the means, motive, and opportunity for 
bullying to occur. Defendants’ failure to enforce their policies spreads the belief among 
young users that they can impose harm behind screens without facing any consequences.  
182. As a direct result of the defective and unreasonably dangerous design of the 
Defendants’ apps, Plaintiff Carson Bride suffered from bullying and harassment by 
unknown users on Defendants’ apps and suffered while being unsuccessful at getting 
Defendants’ apps to reveal the identities of those sending harassing messages.  
183. Defendants’ apps caused Carson’s pain, suffering, and wrongful death. 
184. The Estate of Carson Bride and Class members are therefore entitled to 
compensatory damages for physical and emotional pain and distress such as those suffered 
by Carson Bride in the months leading to his death, and the pecuniary loss and loss of 
society, companionship and services to Carson Bride’s parents as the jury may determine 
fair and reasonable.  
185. The Estate of Carson Bride and Class members are entitled to punitive 
damages for the gross, continued, and callous misrepresentations such as those caused by 
the non-response of Defendant YOLO toward the Estate of Carson Bride, even after being 
notified of his death multiple times.  
186. The Estate of Carson Bride and class members are entitled to expenses such 


































as those incurred by Carson Bride for services including burial and memorial services.  
187. The Estate of Carson Bride and class members are entitled to attorney’s fees 
and reimbursement of all costs as deemed fair and reasonable by the court.  
188. Putative Class members use and would use Defendants’ apps in the future 
which entitles them to injunctive relief.  
 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE  
(Plaintiff Estate of Carson Bride Individually and on behalf of a Nation-wide Class 
Against All Defendants) 
 
189.  Plaintiff Carson Bride, adopts and incorporates by reference all allegations 
contained in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
190. Plaintiff Carson Bride brings this claim individually and on behalf of a 
National class against all Defendants.  
191. Defendants owed a due to use ordinary care in designing, maintaining, and 
distributing its services to teen users. 
192. Defendants were negligent in one or more of the following, each of which 
foreseeably created an unreasonable risk of injury to Carson Bride and was a substantial 
factor in causing Carson’s death and Plaintiff’s resulting damages: 
 Failing to remove the dangerous function of anonymous apps or 
otherwise failing to use reasonable care to address the danger of 
anonymous apps created by Defendants; 


































 Marketing and soliciting teenagers to use the Defendants’ apps without 
safeguards knowing that bullying and harassment would proliferate on 
the platforms; 
 Failure to warn users about the serious negative effects of using the 
anonymity chat apps and instead falsely promoting positive effects;  
 Failure to let users know that their purported safeguards (monitoring, 
reporting, banning, revealing identities) are not effective.  
193. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement its specifications of negligence as to 
each of the Defendants after conducting reasonable and necessary discovery. 
194. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of each of the Defendants, 
Plaintiff Carson Bride suffered from harassment by unknown users within his networks, 
suffered while making unsuccessful attempts to reveal the identities of those sending 
harassing messages, and suffered from the high volume of unfiltered messages sent to him 
that caused his wrongful death. 
195. The Estate of Carson Bride and Class members are therefore entitled to 
compensatory damages for physical and emotional pain and distress, such as those suffered 
by Carson Bride in the months leading to his death, and the pecuniary loss and loss of 
society, companionship and services to Carson Bride’s family, as the jury may determine 
fair and reasonable.  
196. The Estate of Carson Bride and Class members are entitled to punitive 


































damages for the gross, continued, and callous misrepresentations, such as the non-response 
of Defendant YOLO toward the Estate of Carson Bride, even after being notified of 
Carson’s death multiple times.  
197. The Estate of Carson Bride and Class members are entitled to expenses, such 
as those incurred by Carson Bride including burial and memorial services.  
198. The Estate of Carson Bride and Class members are entitled to attorney’s fees 
and reimbursement of all costs as deemed fair and reasonable by the court.  
199. Putative Class members use and would use Defendants’ apps in the future 
which entitles them to injunctive relief.  
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION 
(Plaintiff Estate of Carson Bride, individually and on behalf of a National Class, Against 
All Defendants; Kristin Bride Against YOLO) 
 
200. Plaintiff Carson Bride, adopts and incorporates by reference all allegations 
contained in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
201. Plaintiff Carson Bride brings this claim individually and on behalf of a 
National class against all Defendants.  
202. Kristin Bride brings this claim against YOLO. 
203. Defendants engaged in the tort of common law fraud or fraudulent 
misrepresentation.  
204. The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are (1) the defendant made a 
false representation, (2) in reference to a material fact, (3) that the defendant made with 


































knowledge of its falsity, (4) with an intent to deceive, and (5) reliance was taken based on 
the representation. 
205. As described in the allegations above, the Defendants’ statements about taking 
specific action to address bullying and harassing behavior -- including removing third-party 
apps, banning  abusive users and revealing their identities, reporting to authorities -- were 
in reference to a material fact to consumers, and Defendants knew those statements were 
false when they made them. 
206. The Defendants knew that victims of bullying would rely on the policies and 
assurance.  
207. The Defendants knew from news reports and customer reviews that teen users, 
supervising adults, app stores and app markets would consider the statement in determining 
whether the apps are suitable for teenagers’ use.  
208. Defendant YOLO specifically set up a Contact Us form and a “law 
enforcement” email address for purportedly enforcing their policies. However, reports 
made through the contact form and email address were either invalid and/or ignored. 
209. Carson reasonably relied upon Defendants’ statements to their detriment when 
he began to use YOLO.  Carson, at various points throughout the months preceding his 
death, looked up “YOLO Identity Reveal,” trying to find ways to reveal the identities of 
the anonymous message senders.  
210. Kristin Bride reasonably relied upon YOLO’s representations and sent 


































multiple requests to YOLO to urge YOLO to reveal the message senders’ identities.  
211. In like manner, Plaintiff Carson reasonably relied upon Snapchat and LMK to 
carry out their own stated policies and guidelines when using their apps.  
212. The Defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations proximately caused harm to 
Plaintiffs Carson and Kristin Bride. By not revealing the identities of users who were 
sending anonymous harassing and bullying messages to Carson, the Defendants promoted 
cyberbullying. Defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentation also caused Carson and Kristin to 
expend painstaking, frustrating effort to reveal the identities of abusive users sending 
harassing messages. While investigating which of his friends were sending him the abusive 
messages, Carson felt emotional distress, deep-seated vulnerability, and frustration. While 
relying for Defendants to fulfill their promise, Kristin suffered grief, frustration, anger, and 
helplessness. Defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentation directly contributed to Plaintiff 
Carson’s wrongful death and contributed to Carson’s and Kristin’s emotional harm.  
213. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and Class members are therefore 
entitled to compensatory damages for physical and emotional pain and distress such as that 
suffered by Carson Bride in the months leading to his death, and the pecuniary loss and 
loss of society, companionship and services as the jury may determine fair and reasonable.  
214. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and class members are entitled to 
punitive damages for the gross, continued, and callous misrepresentations such as the non-
response of Defendant YOLO toward the Estate of Carson Bride, even after being notified 


































of Carson’s death multiple times.  
215. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and class members are entitled to 
expenses incurred for services such as those rendered to Carson Bride including burial and 
memorial services.  
216. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and class members are entitled to 
attorney’s fees and reimbursement of all costs as deemed fair and reasonable by the court.  
217. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride and class members are also entitled 
to injunctive relief for ongoing misrepresentations by Defendants. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
(Plaintiff Estate of Carson Bride, individually, and on behalf of a National Class Against 
All Defendants; Kristin Bride against Defendant YOLO) 
 
218. Plaintiff Carson Bride, adopts and incorporates by reference all allegations 
contained in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
219. Plaintiff Carson Bride brings this claim individually and on behalf of a 
National class against all Defendants.  
220. Kristin Bride brings this claims against Defendant YOLO. 
221. Defendants committed the tort of negligent misrepresentation elements of 
which claim are: (1) the defendant made a false statement or omission of a fact, (2) the 
statement was in violation of a duty to exercise reasonable care, (3) the false statement or 
omission involved a material issue, (4) the plaintiff reasonably relied and to its detriment 
relied on the false information, and (5) the defendant’s challenged conduct proximately 


































caused injury to the plaintiff. 
222. As described in the allegations above, Defendants made false statements about 
enforcing a zero-tolerance policy against bullying and harassing behavior, including 
banning users and revealing their identity, reporting harassment by users, and removing 
third-party apps that lack adequate safeguards against bullying and harassing behavior. 
223. These false statements violated the Defendants’ duty of reasonable care to 
provide accurate information to its users, the app stores, and the general public.  
224. As described above, the Defendants’ statements were made in reference to a 
material fact or issue which Plaintiffs Carson reasonably relied on to his detriment, and 
these statements were the proximate cause of his emotional distress damages and caused 
Carson’s wrongful death.  
225. Kristin Bride reasonably relied upon YOLO’s representations and sent 
multiple requests to YOLO to urge YOLO to reveal the message senders’ identities.  
226. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and Class members are therefore 
entitled to compensatory damages for physical and emotional pain and distress such as 
those suffered by Carson Bride in the months leading to his death, and the pecuniary loss 
and loss of society, companionship and services as the jury may determine fair and 
reasonable.  
227. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and class members are entitled to 
punitive damages for the gross, continued, and callous misrepresentations such as the non-


































response of Defendant YOLO toward the Estate of Carson Bride, even after being notified 
of Carson’s death multiple times.  
228. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and Class members are entitled to 
expenses incurred for services rendered such as burial and memorial services.  
229. The Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and Class members are entitled to 
attorney’s fees and reimbursement of all costs as deemed fair and reasonable by the court.  
230. Plaintiff Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, and Class members are also entitled to 
injunctive relief for ongoing misrepresentations by Defendants. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: OREGON UTPA (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605) 
(Plaintiff Estate of Carson Bride, Kristin Bride, on behalf of the Oregon sub-class 
Against All Defendants) 
231. Plaintiff Carson Bride, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated, adopts and incorporates by reference all allegations contained in the foregoing 
paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
232.  The Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”), ORS §646.605 et seq., 
protects persons who obtain real estate, goods or services primarily for personal, family or 
household purposes from fraudulent and unfair business practices. 
233. The UTPA generally prohibits the false representation or false advertising of 
goods and services. ORS §646.608(1)(e). 
234. Defendant’s apps and services are marketed to customers primarily for 
personal, family or household purposes. 


































235. Defendants YOLO, LMK and Snap Inc. violated the UTPA in the following 
respects: 
 Creating and designing anonymous apps which are inherently dangers 
and failing to use reasonable care to address the danger and risk of such 
services; 
 Marketing and soliciting the anonymous app’ services to teenagers that 
lack adequate safeguards knowing that bullying and harassment would 
proliferate on the platforms; 
 Failure to warn users about the serious negative effects of using the 
anonymity chat apps and instead falsely promoting positive effects;  
 Failure to let users know that their purported safeguards (monitoring, 
detection, banning, revealing identities) are not effective; and 
 Making false promises about specific actions they will take to combat 
cyberbullying such as banning abusive users and unmasking their 
identity, reporting to authorities, and removing third-party apps that 
violate zero-tolerance policies about cyberbullying. 
236. Defendant YOLO made affirmative misrepresentations as follows: 
 Knowingly misrepresenting that it would reveal identities of, and ban 
users that engage in inappropriate and bullying conduct on the platform 
when the app is unable and/or unwilling to carry out the policy and 


































notice represented to consumers; 
 Knowingly misrepresenting that it would respond to contacts made by 
users through the Contact Us forms and Law Enforcement emails. 
237. Defendant LMK made affirmative misrepresentations including: “LMK does 
not tolerate ANY objectionable content or abusive users. Any objectionable content posted 
on LMK will be reviewed by our Content Safety team.” Upon information and belief, this 
statement is false.  
238. Defendant Snap Inc. made affirmative misrepresentations conveying that it 
would remove third-party apps that fail to confirm to its community guidelines against 
bullying and harassment. Upon information and belief, this statement is false.  
 
239. The unlawful trade practices alleged herein caused an ascertainable loss of 
injury to Plaintiffs and the sub-class. 
240. Pursuant to ORS 646.638(1), Plaintiffs and each sub-class member is entitled 
to a $200 minimum statutory penalty as a result of the unlawful trade practices alleged 
herein. 
241. Plaintiffs and the sub-class are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees 
pursuant to ORS 646.638(3). 
242. Plaintiffs and the sub-class are entitled to injunctive and equitable relief.  
 


































SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349  
(Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation on behalf of New York sub-class against all 
Defendants) 
 
243. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation restates each and every paragraph of this 
Complaint as if fully rewritten herein. 
244. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation brings this claim on behalf of New York 
Sub-Class members.  
245. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation and New York Sub-Class members and 
Defendants are “persons” under N.Y. Gen. bus. Law § 349(h), the New York Deceptive 
Acts and Practices Act (“NY DAPA”).  
246. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation is associated with members who belong 
to the defined sub-class and have used, or are currently using Defendants’ apps.  
247. Defendants’ actions as set forth herein occurred in the conduct of trade or 
commerce under the NY DAPA.  
248. The NY DAPA makes unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct 
of any business, trade or commerce.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. Defendants’ conduct, as 
set forth herein, constitutes deceptive acts or practices under this section: 
 Creating and designing anonymous apps which are inherently dangers 
and failing to use reasonable care to address the danger and risk of such 
services; 
 Marketing and soliciting the anonymous app’ services to teenagers that 


































lack adequate safeguards knowing that bullying and harassment would 
proliferate on the platforms; 
 Failure to warn users about the serious negative effects of using the 
anonymity chat apps and instead falsely promoting positive effects;  
 Failure to let users know that their purported safeguards (monitoring, 
detection, banning, revealing identities) are not effective; and 
 Making false promises about specific actions they will take to combat 
cyberbullying such as banning abusive users and unmasking their 
identity, reporting to authorities, and removing third-party apps that 
violate zero-tolerance policies about cyberbullying. 
249. In the course of business, Defendants violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 by 
making false or misleading statements. 
 In the course of business, Defendant YOLO made affirmative 
misrepresentations that were conveyed to Plaintiffs and Class members 
including: “if [users] send harassing messages to our users, your 
identity will be revealed” and “YOLO has no tolerance for 
objectionable content or abusive users. You’ll be banned for any 
inappropriate usage.” Upon information and belief, this statement is 
false.  
 In the course of business, Defendant LMK made affirmative 


































misrepresentations including: “LMK does not tolerate ANY 
objectionable content or abusive users. Any objectionable content 
posted on LMK will be reviewed by our Content Safety team.” Upon 
information and belief, this statement is false.  
 In the course of business, Defendant Snap Inc. made affirmative 
misrepresentations conveying that it would remove third-party apps 
that fail to confirm to its community guidelines against bullying and 
harassment. Upon information and belief, this statement is false.  
 
250. In the course of business, Defendants YOLO and LMK made affirmative 
misrepresentations in its Privacy Policy conveying to Plaintiffs and Sub-Class members 
that it collects personally identifiable information to “protect and enforce our rights and the 
rights of other Users against unlawful activity, including identify theft and fraud, and other 
violations of our Terms of Use” which includes their zero-tolerance policy toward bullying 
and harassment.” Upon information and belief, this statement is false.   
251. In the course of business, Defendant YOLO made affirmative 
misrepresentations that conveyed to Plaintiffs and Sub-Class members that certain reports 
and communications sent to their “law enforcement” email or through their CONTACT 
US form would be responded to in a timely manner. Upon information and belief, this 
statement is false.   


































252. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation and New York Sub-Class members had 
no way of discerning whether Defendants’ representations were false and misleading 
because Sub-Class members do not have access to Defendants’ internal protocols, practice, 
and operations regarding their zero-tolerance policy and privacy policy.  
253. Defendants thus violated the NY DAPA by making false statements that 
induced reasonable consumers to believe that the apps would enforce their zero-tolerance 
policy against bullying and harassing behavior, reveal the bad actors’ identities, and 
monitor the contents of users for harmful content as stated in the Defendants’ marketing 
language, app store descriptions, terms of use, and privacy policy.  
254. Defendants intentionally and knowingly made affirmative misrepresentations 
regarding the services on their apps with intent to mislead Plaintiff Tyler Clementi 
Foundation and New York Sub-Class members. 
255. Defendants knew or should have known that their conduct violated the NY 
DAPA. 
256. Defendants’ misrepresentations of their services were material to Plaintiffs 
and Class members. 
257. Defendants’ unfair and deceptive acts were likely to, and did in fact, deceive 
regulators and reasonable consumers, including Plaintiffs and Sub-Class members, 
258. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation and New York Sub-Class members relied 
on the misrepresentations when they used the apps and gave their personal information and 


































data to the Defendants, which Defendants used to make profit.  
259. Defendants’ violations present a continuing risk to Plaintiff, New York Sub-
Class members, and the general public.  
260. Plaintiffs and New York Sub-Class are entitled to all injunctive relief, actual 
and statutory damages and punitive damages to the extent available under the law, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and all other just and appropriate relief available under 
the NY DAPA. 
261. Defendants’ unlawful acts and practices complained of herein affect the 
public interest. 
262. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation and New York State Class members 
suffered ascertainable loss and actual damages as a direct and proximate result of 
Defendants’ actions. 
263. Defendants have an ongoing duty to all customers and the public to refrain 
from unfair and deceptive practices under the NY DAPA. As a result of Defendants’ 
ongoing unlawful acts, Plaintiffs and all Class members are suffering ongoing harm.   
264. As a result of the foregoing willful, knowing, and wrongful conduct of 
Defendants, Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation and Class members have been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial, and seek all just and proper remedies, including but not 
limited to actual damages or $50, whichever is greater, treble damages up to $1,000, 
punitive damages to the extent available under the law, reasonable attorneys’ fees and 


































costs, an order enjoining Defendants’ deceptive and unfair conduct, and all other just and 
appropriate relief available under the NY DAPA. 
 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 350  
(Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation on behalf of New York Sub-Class against all 
Defendants) 
 
265. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation incorporates by reference all allegations 
in this Complaint and restate them as if fully set forth herein. 
266. Plaintiff Tyler Clementi Foundation brings this claim on behalf of New York 
State Class members. 
267. Defendants were engaged in the “conduct of business, trade or commerce,” 
within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350, the New York False Advertising Act 
(“NY FAA”). 
268. The NY FAA makes unlawful “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any 
business, trade or commerce.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350. False advertising includes 
“advertising, including labeling, of a commodity . . . if such advertising is misleading in a 
material respect,” taking into account “the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal 
facts material in light of . . . representations [made] with respect to the commodity . . .” 
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-a. 
269. Defendants caused to be made or disseminated through New York, through 
advertising, marketing, and other publications, statements and omissions that were untrue 


































or misleading, and that were known by Defendants, or that through the exercise of 
reasonable care should have been known by Defendants, to be untrue and misleading. 
270. Defendants made numerous material and affirmative misrepresentations and 
omissions of fact with intent to mislead and deceive concerning the zero-tolerance for 
bullying and harassing users using their apps as well as their use of personally identifiable 
information. 
271. Plaintiff and New York Sub-Class are entitled to all injunctive relief, actual 
and statutory damages and punitive damages to the extent available under the law, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and all other just and appropriate relief available under 
the NY FAA. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION : CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND 
PROFESSIONAL CODE §§17200 & 17500 
(All Plaintiffs on behalf of National Class Against All Defendants) 
 
272. Plaintiffs restate each and every paragraph of this Complaint as if fully 
rewritten herein. 
273. Plaintiffs on behalf of a National Class allege claims under California 
Business and Professional Code §§17200 & 17500 et seq. 
274. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition and prohibited activities. 
275. Unfair competition includes any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or 
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by 
California Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 and 17500 et seq.  


































276. Plaintiffs and the putative National class seek equitable relief and to enjoin 
Defendants from engaging in its current practice and scheme of making misrepresentations 
about their services and guidelines, and enforcement to the detrimental harm of its users.  
277. Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 and 17500 et seq., Plaintiffs and 
the putative National class seek an order enjoining the above-described wrongful acts and 
practices of the Defendants and for restitution and disgorgement. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION : UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(All Plaintiffs on behalf of National Class Against All Defendants) 
 
278. Plaintiffs, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, adopt 
and incorporate by reference all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as 
though fully set forth herein. 
279. Plaintiffs, and the putative National class, conferred a tangible economic 
benefit upon Defendants by signing up as a user to the apps, sacrificing privacy rights and 
privileges, and consuming advertisements.  
280. Through the profits gained by the sale of personal and non-personal 
information of users and other purchases facilitated on the apps, Defendants reaped 
hundreds of millions of dollars of profit from its dangerous and defectively designed 
products and services, misrepresentations and deceptive trade practices. Defendants 
specifically represented in their privacy policies that they would collect private data to 
monitor and detect unlawful and inappropriate content that runs afoul their policies against 


































bullying and harassment. Instead, Defendants were enriched by their collection of minor 
users’ private data and selling it for advertisements and other profitable uses. Plaintiffs lost 
their privacy with no benefit in exchange and was exposed to harm as a result.  
281. Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience to 
permit Defendant to retain the ill-gotten benefits that it received from Plaintiffs and 
members of the putative class. 
282. It would thus be unjust and inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefit 
reaped from Plaintiffs and National Class members without restitution or disgorgement of 
valuable goods (e.g., personal data, in app purchases and more) provided to Defendants, or 
such other appropriate equitable remedy as appropriate, to the Plaintiffs and other members 
of the putative National class. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION : INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
(Plaintiffs and National Class Against All Defendants) 
 
283. Plaintiffs, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, adopts 
and incorporates by reference all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as 
though fully set forth herein. 
284.  Defendants have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 
injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class and subclass, 
thereby making final injunctive relief appropriate. 
285. Defendant’s conduct, as more fully set forth herein, both in the past and 


































through the present, has demonstrated a willful disregard for the health and safety of minors 
and their parents and made misrepresentations and deceptive trade practices.  
286. If Defendants continue with these practices, consumers, including the 
Plaintiffs and the putative classes will be irreparably harmed in that they do not have a 
plain, adequate, speedy, or complete remedy at law to address all of the wrongs alleged in 
this Complaint, unless injunctive relief is granted to stop Defendant’s improper conduct. 
287. Plaintiffs and the putative National class and Sub-classes are therefore, 
entitled to an injunction requiring Defendants to carry out and implement the actions it has 
set forth in its own guidance to prevent bullying. Until the time that safeguards can be 
implemented, Defendants’ app shall be discontinued of its service, temporarily made 
unavailable on all app stores, and cease to allow users to access its app services.  
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the putative representative Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the 
putative members of the class defined herein prays for judgment against the Defendants as 
follows: 
A. For an order certifying this action and/or common issues raised herein as a "Class 
Action under the appropriate provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 
23(b)(2) and/or (b)(3); designating Class Representatives; and appointing the 
undersigned to serve as class counsel. 
B. For notice of class certification and of any relief to be disseminated to all Class 


































Members and for such other further notices as this Court deems appropriated under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2); 
C. For an order requiring complete and immediate disclosure of all studies, reports, 
analyses, data, compilations, and other similar information within the possession, 
custody, or control of Defendants concerning, relating to, or involving the 
marketing, advertising, development, implementation, creation, and partnership 
between Defendants and their media partners; 
D. For an order barring Defendants from destroying or removing any computer or 
similar records which record evidence related to the claims above. 
E. For an order barring Defendants from attempting, on its own or through its agents, 
to induce any putative Class Members to sign any documents which in any way 
releases any of the claims of any Putative Class Members; 
F. For an order mandating YOLO and LMK to be immediately discontinued and 
banned from the market until they can prove that effective safeguards are 
implemented and enforced. Additionally, for an order mandating Snap Inc. to 
immediately remove all third-party apps on Snap Kit that fail to set up appropriate 
safeguards for young users from cyberbullying. For and order restraining Defendants 
from marketing, selling, operating, and otherwise replicating its services, 
specifically, anonymous messaging features, in the form of a different corporate 
entity and service; 


































G. For granting declaratory and injunctive relief to Plaintiffs as permitted by law or 
equity, including: enjoining Defendants from continuing the unlawful practices as 
set forth herein, and directing Defendants to identify, with Court supervision, victims 
of its conduct and pay them, restitution and disgorgement of all monies acquired by 
Defendants by means of any act or practice declared by the Court to be wrongful; 
H. For an award of compensatory damages in the amount exceeding $5,000,000, to 
be determined by proof of all injuries and damages described herein and to be proven 
at trial; 
I. Awarding Plaintiffs and the National Class and Sub-Class members appropriate 
relief, including actual and statutory damages; 
J. Awarding Plaintiffs, the National Class and Sub-Class members punitive damages 
to the extent allowable by law, in an amount to be proven at trial; 
K. Awarding restitution and disgorgement of Defendants’ revenues to the Plaintiffs 
and the proposed Class and Sub-Class members; 
L. Ordering Defendants to change their practice and set up safeguards to prevent 
harassment and bullying online and engage in a corrective advertising campaign; 
M. Compensation to Plaintiff Estate of Carson Bride for the physical and emotional 
pain and distress which Plaintiff Carson Bride suffered during months preceding his 
death from the use of Defendants’ apps, for his wrongful death, for the pecuniary 
loss and loss of society, companionship and services to the parents of Plaintiff 


































Carson Bride including punitive damages against Defendant YOLO for the gross, 
continued, and callous misrepresentations and non-response of Defendant YOLO 
toward Kristin Bride and the Estate of Carson Bride, even after being notified of the 
Carson’s death multiple times, and expenses incurred for services rendered to Carson 
Bride, decedent, including charges for burial and memorial services.  
N. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of 
prosecuting this action, including expert witness fees; 
O. Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and 
P. Providing such other relief as may be just and proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
 Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury for all issues a jury may properly decide and 
for all of the requested relief that a jury may award. 
 
Dated: May 10, 2021   Respectfully submitted, 
 




       Juyoun Han, Esq. (seeking pro hac vice) 
       Eric Baum, Esq. (seeking pro hac vice) 
24 Union Square East, PH 
New York, NY 10003 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs43  
 
43 Plaintiff’s Counsel thanks student intern Patrick K. Lin (Brooklyn Law School, 2L) for his contribution to this case and 
Complaint. 



































/s/ John K. Buche 
John K. Buche (Local Counsel) 
BUCHE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
875 Prospect St., Suite 305 
La Jolla, CA 92037 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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